U.S.-Kenya New Partnership: Shifting the Horn of Africa’s Balance of Power?

By Abukar Sanei

Monday, May 27, 2024

In December 2002, former President George W. Bush welcomed Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia to the White House. The timing of the invitation of the two African leaders is straightforward. About a year and three months ago by the time the meeting takes place, the tragic event of 9/11, the most heinous act of terrorism in the U.S. soil, happened, and the agenda of the meeting with Moi and Zenawi was to bring both leaders on the table as “partners” against the “global war on terrorism.” As it was reported by the BBC, the two leaders were described by Bush as “two strong friends of America… two leaders of countries which have joined us to fight the global war on terrorism.” After the brief address by Bush, both Moi and Zenawi spoke as they underscored their full support of the war on terror. Mr. arap Moi stated that he was most concerned with the security in and around his country and the global fight against terrorism. President Moi’s security concern “around his country” was mainly referring to Somalia. On the other hand, unsurprisingly, the language used by Zenawi was more stronger than the language of Moi as Zenawi affirmed his belief that the war against terrorism “is a war against people who have not caught up with the 21st century; people who have values and ideals that are contrary to the values of the 21st century.” He continued noting that the war “is not a fight between the United States and some groups; it’s a fight between those who want to catch up with the 21st century and those who want to remain where they are.”

Eventually, Zenawi was “crowned” as the trusted partner in the Horn of Africa to execute the agenda of the “global war on terrorism,” and the target country that eyes should be kept on was Somalia. Zenawi had gone above and beyond in his ill-advised interferences in Somalia politically and militarily. In 2004, he played a key role in the establishment of a warlord-led transitional government in Mbagathi, Kenya. In mid 2006, with an overwhelming popular support, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power as they defeated the warlords who failed to provide the Somali people neither governance nor security. However, Meles invaded Somalia as he crashed the ICU and due to his illegal invasion, al-Shabaab was born as they increased their operations inside Somalia as well as their threat to the wider Horn of Africa region. In 2007, the first batch of the African Union forces mostly Ugandans for peace-keeping mission came to Somalia as Meles “withdrew” his forces from Mogadishu after a severe battle and resistance from the people of Mogadishu.

As the “global war on terrorism” that Bush started continues today, Ethiopia, under the current condition, has failed to be a reliable partner, and the U.S. must look for another partner that can continue the mission. As a result, President William Ruto was found to be the ideal partner for the continuation of the war against terrorism. The objective of this article is three folds: what is the U.S.-Kenya new partnership? What does the partnership mean for the Horn of Africa, and finally, the article will conclude by addressing the implications for Somalia regarding the U.S.- Kenya new partnership.

What is the U.S.-Kenya’s New Partnership?

On May 22, President William Ruto came to the United States for an official state visit to the White House. President Ruto’s visit is described as the first state visit by an African president to the White House since 2008. However, the question is what is the U.S.-Kenya’s new partnership, and what does this new partnership mean for the region? According to the White House communication, the strong partnership between Kenya and the United States is based on four pillars. The first pillar is to designate Kenya as a major non-NATO ally. This pillar is to strengthen the security of the two countries and countries around the world. Even though this designation may have a wider objective, it can be attributed as a reward for the recent decision of Kenya to send 1000 police forces to Haiti. The second pillar is to launch what is termed as “the Nairobi-Washington vison.” Under this pillar, it is stated that the objective is to mobilize resources for countries saddled by debt, open opportunities for private sector financing and promote better lending practices. Cooperation on technology is the third pillar of the partnership. The aim of this pillar is “to bolster Artificial Intelligence (AI), semiconductor, and cybersecurity partnerships as well as expanding STEM education and internet access across East Africa.” The fourth pillar of the partnership between Kenya and the United States is “strengthening people to people partnership.” The objective of this pillar is to enhance the democratic principles that connect between the two people.

With those four partnership pillars, however, security is the top critical element of the new partnership between Kenya and the United States. The security pillar can be considered as the main objective behind Ruto’s state visit to the United States. In his address at the White House reception, President Ruto stated that he is confident that the partnership between the United states of America and Kenya will provide solutions that the world so seriously needs. Mr. Ruto touched upon the “heavy lifting Kenya is doing” when it comes to peace and security in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. Even though the Great Lakes is mentioned here, the critical security threat that the United States and Kenya are partnering with is the one that emanates from the Horn of Africa. In order to suppress the threat from al-Shabaab, Kenya invaded southern Somalia in 2011, and then officially became a member of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). However, al-Shabaab targeted Kenya three times in the last two decades. In 2013, al-Shabaab attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi and killed sixty-seven shoppers. In 2015, the terrorist group carried out a horrific attack at Garissa University with 148 people dead, and in 2019, al-Shabaab targeted Dusit D2 Hotel around Westland area and killed about 21 people.

What does the U.S.-Kenya New Partnership Mean for the Horn of Africa?

In order to address the challenges, the United States wants a reliable partner in the Horn of Africa, and at this moment, Kenya is the only country that can fulfill the conditions for three reasons. First, with some fragility that may show up after elections, Kenya can brag that it is a democracy compared to any other country in the East Africa region. Kenya’s transition to democracy started in 2002 after Daniel arap Moi, who ruled the country from 1978, left office. In 2007, Kenya was a brink of collapse as ethnic war erupted after Raila Odinga rejected the election results that gave victory to his rival, Mwai Kibaki. However, in his address at the White House during the welcoming event, President Ruto described his visit and the relationship between the United States and Kenya as a sign of friendship, partnership and collaboration between two countries that share common values of freedom democracy rule of law equality and inclusivity. It is important to note that Kenya’s democracy has been maturing since 2013, and the last election is a testament for this as the well- established Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the first Kenyan President, was defeated by William Ruto, an individual with no establishment in the elite system that the British colonial power left behind.

Second, unlike other countries in the East Africa region, Kenya has an open door for foreign investors as it is also a hub for the East African economy. This brings a positive investment climate that makes Kenya attractive to international firms seeking a location for regional or pan- African operations. This is an area that the United States wants to tap for its multi-national corporations by competing with other economic rivals including China, which has a huge infrastructure investment in Kenya. However, Ruto’s objective is to bring foreign investment to his country as multi-national corporations attract Kenya’s labor force as he claims that he is neither facing West nor East, but facing forward.

Third, Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) have established their presence in southern Somalia, and this will continue in the foreseeable future whether it is under ATMIS or under unilateral or bilateral agreement with the Somali government. It is also possible that Kenya will play a leading role in any post-ATMIS combat operations against al-Shabaab in Somalia. As it is designated as a non-NATO ally – the only country in the sub-Saharan Africa to be given in that status, Kenya will receive all the material support that it needs to confront the security threat posed by al- Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. Through a coordination with AFRICOM, the material support that Kenya will receive from the United States will include AI and cybersecurity as it is stipulated in the pillar three of the new partnership. Finally, it is important to note that the U.S.-Kenya new partnership has revealed that the security partnership between Ethiopia and the United States on the “war against terrorism” that started in 2002 has come to an end as Kenya is now the official reliable partner in dealing with the security challenges in the Horn of Africa.

The Implications for Somalia

By the way of conclusion, the question is what are the implications for Somalia regarding the U.S.-Kenya new partnership? Somalia is not only unstable in security wise; it is also unstable politically as Somalis cannot even agree how to govern themselves. This is a sad reality, and that is why there is African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in the country. The insecurity of the country due to the threats of al-Shabaab, and the political impasse among the elites enable the countries with strategic interests to effectively plan for their interventions. This is why the new partnership between United States and Kenya was introduced.

By looking at the security conditions in Somalia with critical eyes, the planned drawdown of ATMIS forces, which is scheduled for December 2024, is uncertain. Even though President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud started a war against al-Shabaab, a total liberation of the country from al-Shabaab will take time. However, there are two scenarios that are likely to happen. The first scenario is that it is possible to extend the ATMIS timeline for another year as this decision will be made by the UN Security Council before the end of 2024. The second scenario is that another African Union mission with the leadership of KDF will be initiated sometime in 2025. In the process of these two scenarios, Somali officials will, of course, be consulted, but the final decision will be made by the Security Council.

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Keywords: East Africa, Horn of Africa, Kenya, Somalia, Security, United States

Tribute to Professor Mohamud Turyare

By Abukar Sanei[1]

July 21, 2023

On Friday, July 14, 2023, Somali people lost one of its giants when it comes to academia and legal knowledge. This giant that we lost is Professor Mohamud Moallim Ali Turyare, a jurist and scholar. Professor Turyare was born in the town of Ceel Baraf in the Middle Shabelle region in 1929. He started his early Islamic education in that town as he eventually moved to Mogadishu in the late 1940s. In the mid-1950s, which falls during the Trusteeship of the Italians in the southern Somalia, Professor Turyare went to Yemen to continue his formal education, and then around the early or the mid-1960, he went to the Soviet Union to continue his academic journey. As the struggle for African independence was at its peak in the 1950s, there was a higher degree of connection between the former Soviet Union and the African nations that were vying for their liberation and independence from the western colonialists. Due to this condition, the Soviet Union was very attractive to the African students and elites who were eager to study in the Soviet Union so that they can come back and contribute to the political, social and economic development processes of their respective countries. 

Providing opportunities in higher education to African students in the early 1960s was one of the strategies that the former Soviet Union was using to install its relations with the newly independent African states. Similarly, the United States was also welcoming and attracting African students and elites in its universities in the early 1960s as early African immigrants to the United States were those who came to study in the United States. However, Professor Turyare became among the first African students who received their diplomas from the Patrice Lumumba University of People’s Friendship in 1965. It is very important to note that Professor Turyare was among 650 African students who started their first academic year in the fall of 1960. 

In his article in Soviet Education Journal, P. D. Erzin, who was the Vice Chancellor of the University at that time mentioned Professor Turyare by name as one of the African students who successfully defended their graduation projects.[2] I am not sure if Professor Turyare was the only Somali student in the class of 1965, but he was the only Somali that the Vice-Chancellor included his name in the article. However, among other African students that Chancellor Erzin mentioned in the article include philologist Shegun Olumuiva Odunuga from Nigeria, chemist James Ernest Provensal from Ghana, economist Maftakha Karenga from Tanzania and engineering agronomist Sumar Lassana from Mali. In his diploma, Professor Turyare’s specialization was international law. After the completion of his law degree, Professor Turyare came back to Somalia. In 1967-68, he ran his campaign for the Somali Parliament as former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed was his rival for the seat in the Parliament. However, former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed won the seat in the Parliament in 1968. 

Professor Turyare’s Literature 

There are eight books that Professor Turyare solely published, and two books that he was a co-author. Two of the eight books that Professor Turyare published are textbooks that he has exclusively written for students at the Somali National University’s College of Law. One of these two books serves as an introductory textbook of the international law. In 1970, his book entitled, The Positive Non-alliance and Somalia’s Foreign Policy was published in Arabic language. As the timing of the publication of this book was in the midst of the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the non-alliance movement was an agenda that many developing countries including Somalia had embraced. In this book, Professor Turyare was reflecting on how it is important for Somalia’s socialist government that came to power in 1969 through a coup d’état led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre to maintain its “neutral place” between the opposing blocks of NATO and Warsaw. 

The other notable books that Professor Turyare authored include, Western Somali and Self-Determination, and The Conflict of the Horn of Africa in the Light of the International Law. These two books were published in 1978 and 1979 respectively. The context of these two books is very clear as Somalia waged a war against Ethiopia in 1977 in order “to take back the Ogaden region” – a region exclusively inhabited by ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia but was handed to Ethiopian control by the British colonial government in 1948 and 1954.[3] The struggle in the Horn of Africa was mainly about territorial issues – between Kenya and Somalia or between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the rejection of the artificial boundaries demarcated by the British colonial power. As a result, the concept of “greater Somalia” has always been a dream for the Somali people, and Professor Turyare was reflecting on this sentiment in his book about the western Somali or the “Ogaden region.” Moreover, Ali Sheikh Yusuf Adam (Cali Somali), a member of the judiciary system of Banaadir region and Abdulkadir Shaylilah recently noted in their presentation about Professor Turyare that in The Conflict of the Horn of Africa was also critical to Mohamed Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam on their conflict-oriented approach toward boundary issues.[4]

The Service Contributions of Professor Turyare

There are service components that always come along with scholarship, and Professor Turyare contributed his energy and time to service in different capacities nationally, regionally and internationally during his lifetime. Nationally, according to Avv. Cali Somali and Shaylilah, Professor Turyare served as the Deputy Attorney General of Somalia from 1975 to 1983. Also, from 1980 to 1991, he was a legal advisor to Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as he played a key role in his expertise in foreign relations within the perspective of the international law. In the judiciary services, in 1989, he was selected as a member of the High Commission of the Judiciary. However, one can assume that the role that he played in the judiciary commission was very limited as the country was “under one man’s rule.” As a legal scholar, Professor Turyare served as a Professor of law and the Dean of the College of Law at the Somali National University from 1985 to 1991. Other contributions of Professor Turyare include the writing of the Somali Constitution in 1979 and 1990 as well the editor of Law and Economics magazine from 1987 to 1991. At the regional level, Professor Turyare played a critical role both at African Union and the Arab League. From 1983 to 1984, he served as a member of the Organization of African Union’s (OAU) Commission for rectifying the OAU Charter. Also, at the Arab League, he served as a member of the Commission of the International Customary Law. Internationally, from 1985 to 1986, Professor Turyare served as a member of the sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. 

Conclusion

The Somali people lost a great scholar who was very honest in his scholarship as he contributed to the legal system of the country academically as well as through services. The scholarly contributions of Professor Turyare continued after the collapse of the state in 1991. Some of his works that came out after 1991 include Human Rights and Traditional Laws in Somalia (2001) and Somalia’s War and Peace Process (2004). One fact that I should note here is that Professor Turyare was not happy about the process and the attempts of the reconstruction of the Somali state after 1991. In a recent circulated video clip of an address that he was giving in the early 1990s, he warned against any unilateral decision that one faction makes regarding the state-building process. By referring to the norms of the international law, he stated that as long as all political factions or those who fought against the military government are not sitting in the table, no one will recognize any system of governance that is unilaterally announced. In this light, he was directly talking to his own causin former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and his United Somali Congress (USC) allies who announced the transitional government with the absence of major political factions.

The legacy and the work that Professor Turyare left behind are treasure for the Somalia people. We lost Professor Turyare, but his contributions will be alive. May he Rest In Peace.


[1] Abukar Sanei is a Ph.D. Candidate in Mass Communication at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio. Mr. Sanei’s research focus is on media studies with a special interest in media and migration. He is also the Director and co-host of Governance and Development Forum (GDF). 

[2] P. D. Erzin. (1966). The Soviet International Institution of Higher Education presents its first diplomas, Soviet Education, 8 (4), 52-56. 

[3] Human Rights Watch (2008). Collective punishment: War crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali regional state. 

[4] Avv. Ali Sheikh Adam Yusuf and Abdulkadir Shaylilah (2023). Sooyaalka Waxsoosaarka Qaanuuneed ee Professor Turyare.

Lifting Somalia’s Arms Embargo: Why It Is Not Suitable Now?

By Abukar Sanei*

June 22, 2023

Somalia has been under the United Nations Security Council Arms Embargo since 1992 after the collapse of the Somali state as internal war between the militants who overthrew Mohamed Siad Barre ensued. The original resolution that was adapted by the United Nations Security Council was 733 (1992) that came on April 24, 1992, and a committee was established under the resolution 751 (1992) to oversee the general and complete arms embargo. In 2005, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power as they defeated the warlords who have been holding the Somali people hostage since 1991, but unfortunately, the terrorist group al-Shabaab was born around 2006. As Eritrea was “considered the supplier of arms and ammunitions,” in 2009, the arms embargo regime expanded as Eritrea was added to the sanction along with Somalia due to the fear that arms and ammunition can be easily accessed by al-Shabaab.

In recent years, there have been reviews by the United Nations Security Council about the status of the arms embargo as a partial lift of light weapons was granted to Somalia. In the 2022 meeting, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Robert A. Wood voted in favor of renewing the sanction regime of the arms embargo along with ten (10) other Security Council members even though he commended the progress in weapons and stockpile management with the hope that such progress will continue.

On the other hand, the objective of the Somali authorities is not about partial lift. They demand a full lift of the arms embargo, and as a result, in the last couple of years, there have been lobbying for the full lift of the arms embargo. There are, among others, two main arguments for this lobbying efforts. First, as “we are at war with al-Shabaab, we are handicapped, and we don’t have the necessary weapons and arms to defeat the terrorist group al-Shabaab.” Second, “we are a sovereign country, and we need to secure our borders.” In order to advance this lobbying efforts, President Hassan Sh. Mohamud came to the United States this week as he met U.S. officials including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon. In his brief address at the Pentagon, President Mohamud boasted about “his achievements” in terms of security. Yes, some improvements were made, mainly thanks to the vigilante group called Macawisleey, who started their war against al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle and Galmudug regions as of now. However, as the agenda of President Hassan Sh. Mohamud is to ask the full lift of the arms embargo, the daunting question is is Somalia really ready for a full lift of the arms embargo at this moment? The answer is simply no for two reasons: state fragility and, uncertainties in the protection of heavy weapons.

State Fragility

State-building is one of the criteria that can be used to measure the progress that Somalia has made toward maintaining its security. However, the process of a trustable state is still incomplete in Somalia even though it was President Hassan Sh. Mohamud who started the state-building process during his first term from 2012 to 2016. Mistrust among the Somali people still exists as up to date, there has never been a genuine reconciliation that can pave the way for building effective state institutions. Examples of state fragility can be seen from Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Hiiraan, Puntland and most recently Laas Caanood where the people of Sool region are fighting for their destiny. The people of Gedo don’t trust the Jubaland government as the community has been showing some grievances related to the power sharing issue. Similarly, the recent fights in the city of Baraawe in Lower Shabelle is all about fear from “domination.” In Hiiraan, the governor who led the struggle against al-Shabaab in the region was “sacked” as this unnecessary decision is now creating new conflicts in Hirshabelle region. All these crises are examples of how the state-building process is still fragile. Lifting the arms embargo will exacerbate these crises as someone will try to misuse his power and authority against the will of the people.

As these tensions are very real, from his part, President Hassan Sh. Mohamud has completely neglected the process of inclusivity and consensus building as that was clearly seen from the last National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting that was held in May this year. President Said Deni of Puntland has announced that his state will “manage its own affairs,” which means there won’t be a collaboration with the Federal Government. The unfortunate reality that can be seen today from Somalia is that there is a divided society, and the federal government is not working on healing the wounds, but on the contrary, it adds salt to the injury. Due to the state fragility, Somalia is not now suitable for a full lift of the arms embargo.

Uncertainty in the Protection of Weapons

The issue of state fragility and the incapacity to protect light weapons let alone heavy weapons are intertwined. The full lift of the arms embargo requires the Somali government to show that it has capacity to safeguard the heavy weapons, not only from al-Shabaab, but also from clan militias who may wear the security uniforms. If even safeguarding the heavy weapons is guaranteed, the question who can guarantee any misuse/abuse of the heavy weapons to be used for political reasons? Many people are now suspecting President Hassan Sh. Mohamud will stick to power as he may try to impose his “own election modality” that will not be free and fair in 2026 if he is still willing to prepare the country for election.

Moreover, there are two serious concerns that one can see from the current security system in Somalia. First, within the ranks of the Somali security personnel, it is hard to pinpoint who is al-Shabaab sympathizer and who is not. In this environment, it is clear that we don’t even know the real identity of those who will handle the heavy weapons if the full lift of the arms embargo is granted. Second, even though al-Shabaab is “defeated,” they are still capable of using many tactics including bribing the security officials. As was the case in many times, al-Shabaab can get into any area that they want, and there is someone who facilitates their access to wherever they want to attack. The facilitator can be “a member” of the security forces or someone with authority. The recent attacks of Villa Rosa and Pearl Beach Restaurant are some of the examples. Also, recently, the terrorist group raided the Ugandan forces as they were able to obtain more weapons and killed 54 soldiers of the Ugandan forces in Buulo Mareer, in Lower Shabelle region.

The lobbying efforts of the Somali government to gain a complete lift of the arms embargo are commendable, but the reality is that the current conditions are not suitable for a full lift of the arms embargo. Somalia is still a fragile country where the government at the federal and state levels do not enjoy the full trust of the people. Also, heavy weapons require a sophisticated security system, and in Somalia, this is not the case at this time. Therefore, the United Nations Security Council needs to continue its efforts to oversee the situation as it is still premature to grant a full lift of the arms embargo at this time.

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*Abukar Sanei is a Ph.D. Candidate in Mass Communication at Ohio University. He is also the Director and Co-Host of Governance and Development Forum.

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